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The Reference Book. By John Hawthorne and David Manley (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. 
Pp. viii + 264. Price £30.00). (To appear in The Philosophical Quarterly) 
Many moons ago, Bertrand Russell thought of reference in epistemic terms: to mean an object—to 
refer to it—one had to be acquainted with it; for it is ‘scarcely conceivable’ that one should judge 
without knowing what one is judging about. The rest of the relation between language and the 
world is conceived as denoting, a feature of linguistic expressions and bits of the world which 
crucially holds or fails to hold without affecting the reference or meaning of those expressions.  
Since acquaintance is here explained as epistemically fundamental—if one is acquainted with 
something then one cannot be mistaken about either the existence or the identity of the thing—he 
was led to posit sense-data as the only individuals we genuinely refer to.  Post World War Two, for 
various reasons, the last part was not popular, but the idea of acquaintance remained standing, an 
item ripe for philosophical analysis.   It seems there has to be distinction between one’s accepting, 
on the mere probabilities concerning the relative heights of spies, the trivial ‘The shortest spy is a 
spy’, and one’s accepting in typical circumstances ‘You smell’; only the latter undergirds the 
inference to a de re statement of belief.   Surely the difference is that only in the latter case is one 
suitably related epistemically to the object, does one know which object is in question, is one 
acquainted with it. David Kaplan produced memorable work on the issue, as did Gareth Evans in 
much of his book The Varieties of Reference; with the rise of the causal-historical account of 
reference, and especially Kaplan’s later work on demonstratives, their efforts (and that of many 
others) made for a picture that remains recognisably Russellian.    
John Hawthorne and David Manley have written a formidable book—The Reference Book (OUP 
2012)—that must give anyone pursuing this paradigm, or assuming it, however vaguely, a great deal 
think about.  If they are right, no useful version of the relation of reference necessarily involves 
acquaintance, not even a modern causal version; instead they defend Liberalism, according to which 
acquaintance is not required for ‘object-directed thought’.  Furthermore, they argue that there is no 
single category of expression with a special right to be called ‘referential’; the genuine work can be 
accomplished by the use of names, indexicals and demonstratives, definite descriptions, and 
indefinite descriptions such as ‘a certain philosopher’, and furthermore that the semantics of these 
does not fit the pattern of reference as classically conceived.  The upshot is a major reconfiguration 
of what has been known as the theory of reference, with not only ramifications for further work on 
the semantics of natural language but general philosophical ramifications. 
The avowedly more philosophical Part I of the book takes on the key ideas underlying the idea of 
acquaintance, both Russell’s variety and the causal variety; they consider well known arguments 
involving the shortest spy, the distinction between de dicto and de re belief and their respective 
reports, the story of Leverrier and Neptune, Evans’ stories including the famous rotating steel balls 
and Julius, the inventor of the zip, and the purported requirement that one can think a singular 
thought about an object only if one knows of the existence of the object. These ideas, carefully 
considered, do not point towards the usual conclusion but towards Liberalism.  This material is 
effectively organised and articulated in terms of what the authors call Constraint (‘To have a singular 
thought about an object, one must be acquainted with it’; p. 37), Harmony (‘Any belief report whose 
complement clause contains either a singular term or a variable bound from the outside by an 
existential quantifier requires for its truth the subject believe a singular proposition’; p. 38), and 
Sufficiency (‘Believing a singular proposition about an object is sufficient for having a  singular 
thought about it’; ibid.).  More broadly, the aim is to press much harder on the extant  
characterisations of acquaintance that ‘seldom go beyond the off-hand and picturesque’; for ‘[o]ne 
gets the sense that theorists are not quite happy to leave such a significant notion unexplored, but 
at the same time they have not anything very precise to say about it’ (p. 20).  Especially effective was 
a surprisingly compact criticism of the Evans’ intriguing but baroque view; it’s revealed to be an 
unstable, ‘thick’ epistemic conception of knowledge of truth-conditions, an unhappy mixture of 
Cartesian phenomenology with truth-conditional semantics (pp. 74-83).  
Part II is more applied and technical, displaying mastery of a great deal of the work in semantics over 
the past fifty years.  If Frege, Russell, Quine and perhaps even Kaplan used natural language only for 
illustration of points they took to be fundamental and general of application, Hawthorne and 
Manley, carrying on a newer tradition which had its roots in the work of Montague in the 1960’s, 
take fine details of natural language and linguistic intuition as prima facie authoritative.  And 
through a wealth of examples, they find that the phenomena associated with reference are not 
restricted, say, to indexicals and proper names; what they find is that they extend also to definite 
and indefinite descriptions.  In particular, all these are restricted existentially quantified kinds of 
expression, each with a separate manner of presupposing a singleton extension.  Crucially, the case 
of indefinite descriptions is unlike the case of ordinary quantifiers in that a felicitous use of one 
needn’t be candid in how the domain is restricted; it can be coy—there is nothing infelicitous about 
one’s saying out of the blue ‘A certain friend of mine is absent’; the hearer’s understanding will 
piggy-back on the speaker’s.  Whereas an audience without a means of delimiting the relevant 
domain can rightly find fault with a use of ‘every’ (pp. 138-41).   After a long and careful tour through 
the competing views—Russellianism, Montague-Fregeanism—they settle on a similar view of 
definite descriptions; the only important difference between indefinites and definites is that 
definites must be restricted candidly (p. 160); this, they argue, explains the appearance that there is 
a requirement of familiarity on the use of definites.  Demonstratives meanwhile are distinguished by 
the hearer’s ability to grasp the singular restrictor ‘non-parasitically’, which must exploit some 
information that is salient in the context (p. 218).  As for names, they give Burge’s predicate (or 
rather general term) view a good run for its money,  but find that it fails to capture the distinction 
between calling—where one presupposes that one engages in a name-using practice—and 
describing—where one explicitly invokes such a practice, as when one says ‘He is a Smith’ (p. 233f).  
Their conclusion is that although it remains open to prefer the standard referential view of names, 
but, impressed with the apparent affinity with indefinites, definites and demonstratives, one may 
well prefer what they call the ‘minimal’ approach to proper names: They involve a covert existential 
quantifier and singular restrictor, but all this is at the level of presupposition.  Thus a unified 
treatment of the four types of expression is definitely not ruled out.  The book concludes with some 
speculations as to possible options for future work; especially provocative is their consideration of a 
proposal by Paul Pietroski that the work of referring is accomplished entirely at the sub-lexical level, 
a subject properly of cognitive science, not of theorists of language.  
In their handling of cases, I found very, very few places where I took serious issue (except on p. 58: 
as astronomers now teach, there are eight planets, not nine!) and much to admire.  Some might 
wonder whether some of these phenomena might be handled better by means ‘pragmatic 
apologetics’ (p. 49): for such apologists, semanticists often seem to hallucinate precise structure 
where she sees only linguistic participants—aided perhaps by Gricean maxims, the principle of 
charity or principles of relevance—scrambling to communicate by less than perfect means.   But that 
calls for a different book. Their conclusions are exciting, promising philosophers of language 
liberation from an illusory track whereby acquaintance and reference (as traditionally conceived) 
must be regarded as fundamental. Erratum:  p. 196, ‘(54)’ should be ‘(60)’.   
GARY KEMP 
University of Glasgow   
 
  
 
